Finding National Security by Greenman, John
American University National Security Law Brief




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University National Security Law Brief by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greenman, John "Finding National Security," American University National Security Law Brief, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb/vol2/iss1/2




II. Membership in Practice.......................................................................................................................
 A. Targeted Killing..............................................................................................................................
 B. Military Detention and Trial.........................................................................................................
 C. Extraordinary Rendition...............................................................................................................
 D. Preventive Nonmilitary Detention..............................................................................................
 E. Habeas..............................................................................................................................................
III. Membership as Theory.......................................................................................................................
 A. Outsider as Nonperson: Membership.........................................................................................
 B. Outsider as Enemy.........................................................................................................................
 C. Universalism....................................................................................................................................
 D. Globel Due Process.......................................................................................................................
 E. Mutuality of  Obligation.................................................................................................................
F. Equality.............................................................................................................................................
IV. Membership and Substance.................................................................................................................
 A. Congressional Authorization Is Not Substantive......................................................................
? ????????????????????? ???? ??? ????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
V. Membership as Politics.........................................................................................................................
 A. Public Politics..................................................................................................................................
 B. Judicial Politics................................................................................................................................
VI. Solutions................................................................................................................................................
* Assistant Law Professor, University of  Oregon Law School. I would like to thank the Stanford Law School faculty 
for supporting my work on this paper, and in particular professors Dick Craswell, Dan Ho, Larry Lessig, Jeanne 
Merino, Norman Spaulding, Helen Stacy and Bob Weisberg, who helped me a great deal. I would also like to thank the 
????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
Conference, where I presented early versions of  this paper. My colleagues Stuart Chinn, Tom Lininger and Jennifer 
Reynolds all gave generously of  their time. Thanks are also due to professors Ida Bostian, Keith Bybee, Bobby Chesney, 
Brooke Coleman, Charlton Copeland, Stephen Lee, Hillel Levin, Andrea Roth, Suzanne Rowe and Nirej Sekhon. Special 























16 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 2, No. 1
I.  INTRODUCTION
We are more than ten years past the 9/11 attacks. This is a long time. Long enough, I think, to 
look back and see where we are. In this article I try to do that, and also imagine where we will go.
I want to make a big claim. This claim is that, a decade after 9/11, the United States, for political 
reasons, does not have a substantive national security exception. Instead we have a membership based 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
can act without observing a suspect’s individual constitutional rights.1 This exception is not substan-
tive because it does not depend on the threat posed to the nation’s security. A substantive national 
security exception, in other words, would explain what national security is, distinguishing it from 
regular crime. The government could then set aside normal rights when national security—whatever 
it is—is at stake.
Instead of  substance, I argue that the United States has chosen membership???????????????????
security. Under membership, a suspect’s rights depend not on what he has done, but on his connec-
tion to the United States. This connection is determined by nationality and location. U.S. citizens and 
people inside the country—people I call members2—get more rights, while aliens and people outside 
the country—nonmembers—get fewer rights. The membership model is not substantive because it 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
rights against U.S. power in every context.
To see the difference between models, consider a simple hypothetical: the Executive wants to de-
tain someone without trial. The detainee allegedly threatens U.S. national security. Under a substan-
tive model, the Executive agency would need to make a plausible allegation that the detainee threat-
ens mass harm, or, perhaps, is working with a terrorist group.3 Under the membership model, the 
President can detain the suspect if  he is not a U.S. citizen, or is arrested outside the United States, or 
both.
My aim here is to prove that the United States has chosen the membership model, and explain 
why. Scholars have argued about what the substance of  the national security exception should be. 
1 I mean the personal constitutional rights that constrain the government when it threatens, captures, detains or uses 
violence against people, such as the right to Due Process and Liberty. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. 
CONST. amend.  XIV, §1 (highlighting respectively the right to be free from unlawful search and seizure; the right not to 
be deprived from life, liberty or property, without due process of  the law; and these rights as applied to the states). 
? ?????????????????????????????????? ? ????????????????????????? ?????? ???????????????????????????????????See 
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) [hereinafter Neuman, Whose Constitution].
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????See 
infra Part II.E.
3 There are other possible substantive models.  
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These arguments are usually endorsements of  international law,4 or proposals for new U.S. policies.5
But no one has explained the political dynamic that is preventing these substantive proposals from 
becoming law. And while scholars have written about membership in extraterritorial rights,6 no one 
has examined the relationship between membership and the national security exception.7
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
government acts in the name of  national security. The second argues that there is no good theoreti-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????-
ing national security. The fourth explains the politics that have led us to choose membership over 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
towards substance.
II. MEMBERSHIP IN PRACTICE
The government, when acting in the name of  national security, is more likely to recognize the 
rights of  someone inside the country than outside it, and more likely to give rights to citizens than 
aliens. Congress does this either by passing laws that target only outsiders, or by delegating discretion 
to the Executive. The Executive, when exercising this discretion, has directed national security mea-
sures only at nonmembers. The courts, meanwhile, defer to the political branches’ claimed national 
security power when it is used against outsiders.8
Before continuing, let me clarify terms. When I talk about people outside the country, I mean 
outside the territorial United States. In the national security context—which is the focus of  this 
4  See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of  War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 295 (2010) (offering that both international law and the U.S. Constitution constrains the jurisdiction of  military 
commissions); Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of  Terrorism Threats and the Laws of  War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
international humanitarian law); David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law of  War, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 957 (2009) (proposing that the observation of  international standards of  war is essential in sustaining the 
war on terror); Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law in the United States, 39 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 135 (2008) (criticizing the United States for not using international standards nor its own constitutional 
standards for treatment of  detainees).
5  See, e.g., David Cole, Out of  the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693 (2009) 
[hereinafter Cole, Out of  the Shadows] (proposing a new preventive-detention law); Glenn Sulmasy, The Need for a National 
Security Court System, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1007 (2009) (proposing a national security court).
6  See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 307 
(2011); Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality and the War on Terror, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1258 (2011); Bruce Corey, Note, 
At Writ’s End: Using the Law of  Nations to Decide the Extraterritorial Reach of  the Suspension Clause, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374 
(2010); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 
(2009); José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application of  U.S. Constitutional Law,
118 YALE L.J. 1660 (2009); Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
225 (2010) [hereinafter Cleveland, Embedded]; Kal Raustiala, The Geography of  Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005); 
Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 2.
7  See, e.g., Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, supra note 6. 
8  The only exception is the recent policy-perfecting push by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008), the most important Guantanamo case. E.g., id. at 766.
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article—extraterritorial rights usually are rights against executive action. When the United States 
picks up a suspect in Macedonia—or any other foreign country—and imprisons him in Afghanistan, 
he can try to get into U.S. court with a habeas petition.9 The question presented is whether he has 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
whether those rights were violated.10 Here, I am concerned with the question of  whether a suspect 
arrested abroad by U.S. forces has any rights under the U.S. constitution.11
I also use the terms “member” and “nonmember” (or, alternatively, “insider” and “outsider”). 
These terms combine two different legal concepts: nationality and territoriality. Treating them as a 
single category therefore obscures legal distinctions. A nonmember, as I use the term, might be a 
citizen abroad, or an alien at home, or a non-U.S. citizen abroad. So something is lost by using the 
word “member.” But membership is still useful; it helps explain the political dynamic behind our 
national security law, in which nationality and territoriality work the same way: as proxies for other-
ness. When the government decides not to recognize rights, it uses nationality and territoriality to 
convince citizens at home that they will not be targeted. Thus, when Congress approves of  military 
detention,12 the law only targets aliens. And when a court approves of  targeted killing,13 it limits its 
holding to U.S. action overseas even though there is no doctrinal reason to do so.14
Both nationality and territoriality determine a relationship to the United States, the relationship 
that, in turn, determines the availability of  individual rights. One becomes a member—a party to the 
social contract with the United States—either by being a citizen or inside the United States, where 
the Constitution presumptively applies.15 Both are also extrinsic to national security. Noncitizens get 
fewer rights solely by virtue of  being noncitizens; the same is true of  people, whether U.S. citizens 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
national security.
In making this point I discuss four national security practices: 1) targeted killing; 2) military 
detention and trial; 3) extraordinary rendition; and 4) nonmilitary preventive detention. Each tactic, I 
argue, is more likely to be used against nonmembers than members. I will also look at habeas corpus, 
the main vehicle for judicial review of  national security detention.
9  See infra Part II.E.
10  Id.
11  I would distinguish the extraterritorial application of  constitutional rights against Executive action from the 
question of  whether the U.S. can create laws that apply in other countries, an important but distinct question. See
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-59 (1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
12  See Military Commissions Act, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????invalidated by
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
13  See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 51 (D.D.C. 2010). 
14  See infra Part II.A.  
15  See infra Part III.A.
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A. Targeted Killing
Targeted killing is the premeditated attempt to kill without trial.16 The United States directs tar-
geted killing at nonmembers by only targeting people outside the United States.17 The United States 
has targeted people for some time—Fidel Castro, for instance18—and has killed an alleged terrorist 
and U.S. citizen in Yemen.19
That citizen was Anwar al-Aulaqi.20 Al-Aulaqi was one of  several citizens who, according to the 
Washington Post, was put on the targeted “capture or kill” list by the C.I.A and Air Force,21 although 
he was the only named target.22 He was implicated in several attacks on the United States, including 
encouraging Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist charged with killing 13 people at Fort 
Hood Army Base.23 While it is clear that al-Aulaqi encouraged violence against the United States—
he called Major Hasan a hero24—his family denied that he was a terrorist.25 The C.I.A killed him with 
a Predator Drone.26
We know this in part because Al-Aulaqi’s father Nasser sued to stop the United States from kill-
16 See????????? ?????????????????????????????Due Process and Targeted Killing of  Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 
405 (2009).
17 The discussion regarding targeted killing within the United States remains in the hypothetical realm. See Jonathan 
Ulrich, ??????????? ???? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????, 45 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1029, 1059 (2005) (describing the effect of  setting a precedent that extends executive power to order targeted 
killings to “any time, [sic] anywhere”); see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror,
35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 326 (2003) (arguing that the extension of  allowing targeted killing anywhere in the world 
would allow targeted killing within the United States).
?? ? ??????????????????????? ????????Law and Policy of  Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 149 (2010). Of  
course, the United States may have covertly targeted people in the United States without informing us.
19 See Mark Mazzeti et. al., Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of  Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1; see also
Dana Priest, U.S. Playing a Key Role in Yemen Attacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Priest, U.S. Playing]
(describing the responsibility that the U.S. intelligence had in orchestrating the Yemen attacks). 
20 Scott Shane, Many Terrorism Suspects Linked to the Radical Cleric Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, November 19, 2009, at A1 
[hereinafter Shane, Many Terrorism]. (stating that Al-Aulaqi was born in New Mexico but then moved to Yemen, later 
returning to the United States for college and graduate school).




25 Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki, BBCNEWS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920.
26 See  Jane Mayer, The Predator War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 40. Predators are remote-controlled and 
unmanned. Id. The United States uses them for targeted killings in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Times Topics: Predator 
Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_
aerial_vehicles/index.html [hereinafter Times Topics: Predator Drones]. There are currently two drone programs, one run 
by the military and the other by the C.I.A. Mayer, supra at 26. While the military releases information about its drone 
????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????In a First, U.S. Provides Pakistan with Drone Data,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A14; David Zucchino, Combat by Camera, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A1. The 
United States’ use of  Predators is increasing; the Obama administration expanded the CIA program in late 2009. Times
Topics: Predator Drones.
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????27
and “there are no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize the 
threat.”28 In other words, Nasser was pressing for a substantive national security test—one tied to the 
threat his son posed and the government’s ability to respond.
The court dismissed Nasser’s claim,29 in part because it presented a political question30 that is 
constitutionally committed to the political branches and therefore nonjusticiable.31 The court was, in 
its view, incompetent to assess the use of  “military force against a terrorist target overseas.”32
This holding is radical in its own way. No other modern court has held that the Executive can 
target a U.S. citizen on mere allegations of  terrorism.33 Indeed, it presents the Executive with a dan-
gerous power (the court describes it as “unsettling”34).
Presumably, this is why the decision is limited to overseas targets. But—and this is the oddity of  
the decision—there is no doctrinal reason for this. In fact, doctrine suggests a different outcome. 
As Professor Kevin Jon Heller has noted,35 U.S. law expressly provides that even the overseas killing 
of  a U.S. national is murder.36 Congress has made it perfectly clear that the law protects U.S. citizens 
when they go abroad. There is no precedent for the removal of  rights of  U.S. citizens on political-
question grounds. No court has ever used the political-question doctrine to dismiss a citizen’s claim 
that his rights were violated by U.S. action abroad.37 Moreover, the law of  extraterritoriality—the 
doctrine that governs whether the Constitution applies abroad—dictates the opposite result. U.S. 
citizens abroad do have constitutional rights. There is no ambiguity about this: “When the Govern-
ment reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad . . . the Bill of  Rights and other parts of  the 
Constitution provid[ing] to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he 
27 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010).
28  Id.
29  The court held that 1) al-Aulaqi’s father lacked standing and 2) the case was barred by the political-question 
doctrine and 3) the threat of  a future state-sponsored extrajudicial killing was not a cognizable tort under the Alien Tort 
Statute. See generally Id.
30  Id. at 52.
31  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-38 (1962).
32  Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (emphasis added).
33  Courts have not even allowed surveillance of  U.S. citizens on the grounds of  suspicion of  terrorism or national 
security threat. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that presidential directives do not 
overcome the requirement for a warrant in the domestic installation of  wiretaps); see also Amnesty Int’l U.S.A. v. Clapper, 
638 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2011) (summarizing the amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of  1978 
which continue the prohibition of  targeting those within the United States for surveillance in a manner inconsistent with 
the Constitution of  the United States).
34  Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
35  Kevin Jon Heller, Let’s Call Killing al-Awlaki What It Is — Murder, OPINIO JURIS (April 8, 2010), http://opiniojuris.
org/2010/04/08/lets-call-killing-al-awlaki-what-it-is-murder/.
36  “A person who, being a national of  the United States, kills or attempts to kill a national of  the United States while 
such national is outside the United States” shall be punished, if  relevant, as murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006); see also id.
§ 1111 (2006).
37  Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
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happens to be in another land.”38 Citizens abroad have the right to jury trial.39
The political-question holding rests on the fact that the decision to kill Al-Aulaqi was a “mili-
tary” decision (although technically this is wrong)40 that related to “national security.”41 But military 
and national security actions are not inherently territorial. There is no doctrinal reason that a deci-
sion authorizing targeted killing on the basis of  national security should apply only overseas. 
The holding makes sense, though, as a political story. The decision to use armed drones in Ne-
vada would be more controversial than the decision to use them in Yemen. Presumably courts would 
be more likely to intervene—to actually enjoin the use of  force—if  it were on U.S. soil. So the 
Executive chooses not to target people in the United States, and the court refuses to authorize using 
drones in the United States. 
This is not to say that the judgment was wrong.42 It might be right for the wrong reason. A 
?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????43 This changes the risk 
involved in capturing him. A substantive rule could take this risk into account, factoring location 
into a test based on threat posed, and the government’s capacity to respond. But if  the government 
could have legally targeted Al-Aulaqi because 1) he posed an active threat and 2) it would have un-
duly risked U.S. lives to arrest him, then that should be the test. As with other national security issues, this 
question is not hypothetical. The government is now trying to kill three other unknown Americans44
who might be protected under a substantive test.  
B. Military Detention and Trial
Perhaps because military detention is controversial, the Executive rarely uses it at home. Of  all 
the post-9/11 detainees arrested in the United States, only two—Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri45 and 
38  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
39  Id. at 18-19.
40  As best we can tell, the CIA, not the Air Force, is running the operation, although they now work together. See 
??????????????????????????????, Yemen Covert Role Pushed: Foiled Bomb Plot Heightens Talk of  Putting Elite U.S. Squads in 
CIA Hands, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870447790457558663
4028056268.html. The CIA is not a military organization, but a paramilitary one. Still the CIA is an extraterritorial agency, 
limited in its domestic operations. 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(1) (2006) (denying any police, law enforcement, subpoena, or 
internal-security functions to the CIA). The same is true of  the Air Force. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (describing the 
repercussions for employing any part of  the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus). A rule that says targeted killing is 
okay when done by the CIA or Air Force is thus a rule that keeps targeted killing outside the United States.
41  Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 49-52.
42  For a good discussion see John C. Dehn, Targeted Killing: The Case of  Anwar Al-Aulaqi,  159 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 175
(2010)..
??? ??????????????????supra note 40.
44  Priest, U.S. Playing, supra note 19 at A1
45  For a partial history, see al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), vacated and remanded
by al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
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Jose Padilla—were put into military detention. 46 Both challenged their detentions in court.47 The 
President eventually chose to move them both into criminal detention rather than argue the military-
detention issue in the Supreme Court.48
For people arrested within the United States, the Executive has chosen criminal detention. This 
is less true with people arrested abroad. Detainees picked up overseas were housed at Guantanamo49
and Bagram Air Force Base.50 Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen picked up in Afghanistan, was also kept in 
military detention.51 Courts have approved these detentions, subject to procedural requirements.52
Congress also directs military detention at outsiders. The portion of  the Military Commissions 
Act (MCA) that creates a statutory framework for military trial applies only to alien unprivileged 
enemy belligerents.53 The act sweeps very broadly, taking in people who have “purposefully and ma-
terially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents.”54 This material-support 
provision seems at odds with international law.55 The habeas-stripping provisions of  the MCA also 
apply only to noncitizens.56
The targeting of  outsiders is included in the most recent national-defense authorization, now ap-
proved in the House but not the Senate. The bill restricts detainee treatment and procedure, but only 
46  For a history of  the proceedings see Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
47  Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 386 (4th Cir. 2005); al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 216-17.
48  After a complicated series of  opinions giving conditional support for the Executive’s view, see generally Padilla, 423 
F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), al-Marri, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to al Marri. Al-
Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008). Rather than argue at the Supreme Court, the Executive transferred al Marri to 
the criminal system. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). The President transferred Padilla into criminal custody 
before the Supreme Court reviewed his petition for certiorari. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring).
49  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008).
50  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
51  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
52  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723; Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 99; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24. It is important to distinguish 
between executive power to detain and the right to habeas. They are separate (although obviously closely linked) analyses.
53  Military Commissions Act, ???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ???????????????? ?
citizens on other authority (based, for example, on executive power alone, or other statutes). For a fuller discussion see
Jack Balkin, Does the Military Commissions Act Apply to Citizens?, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 29, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2006/09/does-military-commissions-act-apply-to.html.
54  Military Commissions Act, § 948a(1)(A)(i), 120 Stat. at 2601.
55  Which does not mean that it is unconstitutional or invalid. See Ryan Goodman, The Detention of  Civilians in Armed 
???????, 103 AM. J. INTL ???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
utilized).
56  Military Commissions Act, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????invalidated by
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The MCA does contain some substantive provisions: it lists offenses triable 
by military commission. Military Commissions Act, § 950v(b), 120 Stat. at 2626.  But it does not provide that it is the 
sole Congressional authority for military commissions. See Balkin, supra note 53 (explaining that Department of  Defense 
determinations are not conclusive and the legality of  detaining “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo should be reviewed 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
polices—than as a limit on the national security power.
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for noncitizen detainees (excluding alien members of  the armed forces).57 It prevents the Executive 
from transferring alien detainees to the United States.58 The bill, if  passed as is, would attempt to 
limit executive power. But this limitation does not prevent the executive from using military deten-
tion. Rather it requires military detention for some59 terroristic offenses.60????????????????????????????
of  national security applies, again, only to “any person who is not a citizen of  the United States.”61
We can wonder, as with other national security laws, whether the MCA would be different if  it 
applied to citizens. Certainly the law was sold as targeting outsiders. Senator Lindsey Graham, the 
bill’s sponsor, said that the MCA was needed to stop enemy aliens from having “an unlimited right 
of  access to our federal courts like a U.S. citizen.”62  Indeed, the MCA is rarely used against citizens 
due to the controversial nature of  that application.
C. Extraordinary Rendition
Extraordinary rendition is the transfer of  someone, without due process, to another place where 
there is a risk of  torture.63 Every documented target of  U.S. extraordinary rendition has been an 
outsider—an alien arrested abroad.64 There is evidence that the United States uses extraordinary 
rendition for interrogation. The idea is to transfer a prisoner to an allied state, one where torture 
is routine, so that the United States need not torture directly.65?????????????????????????????????????
Washington Post, “We don’t kick the shit out of  them. We send them to other countries so they can 
57  See? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ???????????.
58  Id. at § 1039.
59  The alleged crime also must be subject to trial by military commission under military law. Id. at § 1042.
60  Id.
61  Id.
62  Neil A. Lewis and Kate Zernike, Measures Seek to Restrict Detainees’ Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, September 21, 2006, 
at A22.
63  Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of  Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1333, 1336 (2007) [hereinafter Satterthwaite, Rendered].
64  As with other practices, there is always the chance that the United States has secretly rendered citizens and never 
been caught. But all the documented cases involve foreign nationals. See id. at 1338-43 (listing examples of  extraordinary 
rendition of  foreign nationals); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on 
Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1217-18 (2007) (noting that the United States has not claimed the power to render 
a U.S. citizen to a foreign country for interrogation). We can distinguish the case of  Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a U.S. citizen 
arrested in Saudi Arabia who alleged he was tortured, in that Abu Ali was never transferred—he was arrested and 
detained in Saudi Arabia. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 224-26 (4th Cir. 2008), appealed after new sentencing hearing
United States v. Abu Ali, 410 Fed. App. 673 (4th Cir. 2011). And, like all the other U.S. citizens captured in the “war on 
terror,” Abu Ali was eventually transferred into criminal custody. Id. at 226. Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, was arrested 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????COMM. ON INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ASS’N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS,” 14-16(2004) [hereinafter TORTURE BY
PROXY], available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf.
65  TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 64, at 14-16.
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kick the shit out of  them.”66
Some alleged rendition victims have sued in U.S. courts. They all lost on the pleadings. In Mo-
hamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,67 for instance, transferees sued Jeppesen, a private company that alleg-
?????????????????????????????????????68  Their stories are brutal:
?? One plaintiff  alleged the following: that Swedish authorities arrested him in Sweden.69
?????????????????????????????????????????????????70? ???????????????????????????????
squalid, windowless, and frigid cell,” where he was beaten and shocked with electrodes 
on his ear lobes, nipples and genitals.71 According to plaintiffs, “every aspect of  [his] 
rendition, including his torture in Egypt, has been publicly acknowledged by the Swedish 
government.”72
?? An Italian citizen was arrested and detained in Pakistan on immigration charges.73 He
alleged the following: that after several months in Pakistani detention, he was given to 
??????????????????74 They dressed him in a diaper and a torn t-shirt and shackled and 
?????????????? ???????????????? ???????75 Moroccan security services beat him, denied 
him sleep and food, and threatened him with sodomy and castration.76
?? An Ethiopian citizen was arrested in Pakistan on immigration charges.77 He alleged 
??????????????????????????????????? ???????78 where Moroccan authorities beat him, 
breaking his bones.79 Using a scalpel, they cut his penis and poured “hot stinging liquid” 
into the wounds.80 He was later transferred to Guantanamo, where he was imprisoned 
??????????????81 Eventually he was released to the United Kingdom.82
The CIA picked up another alleged victim, the German citizen Khaled el-Masri, in               
??? ? ???????????????????? ??? ????U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism 
Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1.
67  614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
68  Id. at 1073.
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Macedonia. 83 The CIA stripped, beat and shackled him, “dressed [him] in a diaper, injected [him] 
???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????84 It was probably a case of  
mistaken identity.85 The man who was actually arrested, however, was “an entirely innocent man.”86
Eventually the CIA realized its mistake, dumped him in Albania, and admitted the error to Germa-
ny.87 But when el-Masri sued the United States, the government invoked the state-secrets doctrine, 
allowing it to withhold the evidence he needed to make his case.88 He lost.89
The state-secrets doctrine allows the government to privilege information in the “interest of  
national security.”90 It has been used against U.S. citizens at home.91 But, in those cases, there was no 
allegation of  torture or other gross human-rights abuses.92 We should wonder, again, if  the public 
would allow this if  the detainees were innocent U.S. citizens picked up at home. If  the answer is no, 
we should then wonder what it is about el-Masri or the others that allows us to treat them differently. 
If  my thesis is correct—that the U.S. is avoiding dealing with the consequences of  its national 
security practices by directing them at outsiders—then it would follow that extraordinary rendition, 
which is the most brutal national security practice, is also the most “outside.” Rather than directing 
it at aliens in the United States, or citizens abroad, extraordinary rendition is reserved for those who 
are least visible: aliens abroad. Indeed, the point of  extraordinary rendition is to physically move 
torture somewhere far from the United States.
83  See Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of  a CIA Mistake: German Citizen Released After Months in ‘Rendition,’
WASH. POST., Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Priest, Wrongful].
84  Khaled El-Masri, I Am Not a State Secret, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at A14.
85  Id.
86  Id.
87  Id.; Priest, Wrongful, supra note 83, at A1.
88  El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
89  Id. at 313.
90  Id. at 302
91  See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1953). When three civilians died in a military plane crash, for 
instance, the government invoked the privilege to protect the accident report from discovery. Id. And it has been used to 
stop discovery in contract claims between military contractors and the government, most recently in General Dynamics 
Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1910 (2011).
92  Professor Robert Chesney has written about the drift of  the state-secrets privilege from a law that prevents civil 
recovery to a law that potentially obstructs public justice by protecting illegal government behavior. See Robert Chesney, 
The Jeppessen Decision and the Issue of  Good Faith in Asserting the State Secrets Privilege, LAWFARE, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2010/09/the-jeppessen-decision-and-the-issue-of-good-faith-in-asserting-the-state-secrets-privilege/. 
The cases from U.S. citizens alleged civil wrongs and unconstitutional surveillance. See id.; Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 
Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). Surveillance is an interesting test case for my hypothesis, because it 
has been applied to insiders. See id. At the same time, it is the least intrusive of  the national security measures used by 
the government. It is telling that the one national security practice that is (sometimes) directed at insiders is the least 
disruptive. Even so, national security surveillance still targets outsiders more than insiders; FISA restricts the collection 
of  foreign intelligence information in the United States, but not outside the United States. See Foreign Intelligence 
?????????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2002)).
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D. Preventive Nonmilitary Detention
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
intended to stop a national security threat. There was a wave of  preventive detentions after 9/11, 
but no preventive-detention statute authorized these detentions.93 Rather, they were pretextual, justi-
?????????????????????????????????????94
The burden of  preventive detention fell hardest on noncitizens. The main source of  post-9/11 
preventive-detention authority was immigration law.95 After 9/11, the Bush administration preven-
tively detained over 5,000 foreign nationals, most of  them Arab or Muslim.96 Many were not charged 
with immigration violations, and some were held after judges had ordered them released.97 But “not 
one of  the more than 5,000 detained foreign nationals was convicted of  a terrorist offense.”98
Along with immigration law, the other authority for the 9/11 detentions was the material-witness 
statute. This statute authorizes the detention of  witnesses to secure testimony in a criminal pro-
ceeding, and is not limited to aliens.99 Of  the seventy or so people detained under the statute, only 
seventeen were U.S. citizens.100
The 9/11 attackers were noncitizens, so it makes sense that the government’s immediate re-
sponse would target noncitizens. But we see the membership dynamic in play in the different rem-
edies available after wrongful preventive detention. Members who were mistakenly detained were 
much more able to remedy this situation. Abdullah al-Kidd, for instance, was a U.S. citizen arrested 
in the United States.101 He was held in terrible conditions, but released after sixteen days.102After
release, al-Kidd sued Attorney General Ashcroft, two FBI agents, and the wardens who controlled 
his detention.103 The wardens settled the case.104 And while the Supreme Court dismissed the claim 
against Ashcroft,105 the suit against the FBI agents is still pending.106
93 See Cole, Out of  the Shadows, supra note 5 at 693. 
94 Id. at 695.
95 Some preventive detentions were also military. I have already addressed military detention. See supra Part IB.  
Finally, other preventive detentions were accomplished through a pretextual use of  criminal laws. See Cole, Out of  the 
Shadows, supra note 5, at 703. For my purposes ordinary criminal prosecution, even if  pretextual, is outside the national 
security exception because it affords ordinary rights and defenses. 
96 See Cole, Out of  the Shadows, supra note 5, at 703.
97 See Cole, Out of  the Shadows, supra note 5, at 704. 
98 Cole, Out of  the Shadows, supra note 5, at 704.
99  18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
100 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2005/06/26/
witness-abuse.
101  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011).
102 Id.
103  Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, 2006 WL 5429570, *1 (D. Idaho 2006), rev’d in part by Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 
(2011).
104 Two of  them agreed to reform their detention practices. See ACLU, ABDULLAH AL-KIDD V. JOHN ASHCROFT, ET AL.,
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-national security/abdullah-al-kidd-v-john-ashcroft-et-al.
105  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (2011).
106 Id. (Kennedy J., concurring) (“The Court’s holding is limited to the arguments presented by the parties and leaves 
unresolved whether the Government’s use of  the Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful.”). 
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Compare al-Kidd to el-Masri (or, for that matter, any of  the extraordinary-rendition victims or 
Guantanamo detainees). Both were mistakenly perceived to be national security threats. But Al-Kidd 
was released after sixteen days; el-Masri after more than four months. Al-Kidd was shackled; el-Mas-
ri was beaten, injected with drugs, and dressed in a diaper. Al-Kidd won a monetary settlement, and 
still has a chance of  winning on the merits. El-Masri has no such chance.
When it comes to laws that are designed for preventive national security detention, outsiders 
are also targets. Section 412 of  the Patriot Act gives the Attorney General the power to remove or 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????107 There are some restrictions: the Attorney 
General has to charge the alien within seven days and periodically certify that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe he or she is a national security risk.108 Some applications of  Section 412 may be 
unconstitutional;109 perhaps for this reason it has never been used.110 And the Enemy Alien Act, 
passed in 1798, provides that when the United States has declared war it can remove or detain un-
naturalized citizens of  the enemy state.111 There need not be an individualized determination of  
hostility—it is enough that the detainee is a citizen of  the enemy state.112
E. Habeas
Habeas is at the heart of  post-9/11 constitutional litigation. The Guantanamo detainees, im-
prisoned by the military, turned to the remedy of  habeas corpus to challenge their detentions. This 
effort culminated in Boumediene v. Bush. In Boumediene, the Court ruled for the prisoners, holding that 
the Constitution grants courts jurisdiction to review their cases.113
The Boumediene detainees—the prisoners trying to get into federal court—were captured outside 
the United States. As the Court noted, they came from all over:
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
away from there as Bosnia and Gambia. All are foreign nationals, but none is a citizen 
of  a nation now at war with the United States. Each denies he is a member of  the al 
Qaeda terrorist network that carried out the September 11 attacks or of  the Taliban 
regime that provided sanctuary for al Qaeda.114
Lakhdar Boumediene, the lead petitioner, lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) when he was 
???? ??????????????????? ??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(2006)).
108  Id.
109  See Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of  Aliens Under the USA PATRIOT Act,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1455 (2003).
110  Cole, Out of  the Shadows, supra note 5 at 748.
111  50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006).
112  See id.
113  553 US 723, 766 (2008).
114  Id. at 724.
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arrested.115 He worked for the Red Crescent.116  For reasons that are still unclear, the United States 
believed that Boumediene was planning to blow up the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo.117 The 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
police had no independent reason to suspect them.118 The Bosnians complied.119 After the arrest, 
Bosnian police tried to verify U.S. claims, but could not.120 The prisoners, arrested without evidence, 
petitioned the Bosnian courts.121 The Bosnian High Court ordered them freed.122 Then, according 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
remove the peacekeeping troops.123 The United States denies this allegation, but does admit to using 
diplomatic pressure.124 In response, Bosnia handed the prisoners to the United States.125
In Guantanamo, military commissions tried the detainees.126 These tribunals found that the 
detainees were “enemy combatant[s],” which, according to the Executive, gave it authority to detain 
them.127 But the evidence against Boumediene and the others was not strong. The following ex-
change, from the hearing of  detainee Ait Idir, is typical.128 Idir was accused of  associating with an al 
Qaeda operative,129 but he was never told who that person was:130
Detainee: Give me his name.
Tribunal President: I do not know.
Detainee: How can I respond to this?
Tribunal President: Did you know of  anybody that was a member of  Al Qaida?
Detainee: No, no.
. . .








121  Cody, supra note 115, at A14.
122  Jilani, supra note 118. 
123  See id. at 733-34.
124  Id.
125  Id.
126  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008).
127  See id.
128  Brief  for Boumediene Petitioners at *4 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), 2007 WL 2441590.
129  Id.
130  Id.
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Tribunal President: No?
Detainee: No. This is something the interrogators told me a long while ago. I
asked the interrogators to tell me who this person was. Then I could tell you if  I might 
have known this person, but not if  this person is a terrorist. Maybe I knew this person 
as a friend. Maybe it was a person that worked with me. Maybe it was a person that 
was on my team. But I do not know if  this person is Bosnian, Indian or whatever. If
you tell me the name, then I can respond and defend myself  against this accusation.
Tribunal President: We are asking you the questions and we need you to  
??????????????????????????????????????????????131
Boumediene eventually won in the Supreme Court, and his case was remanded to district 
court.132??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?133 It was 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????134 The Court concluded that clas-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????135 The district court 
ordered Boumediene’s release,136 and he was set free in the spring of  2009.137
The larger question was whether Congress could stop federal courts from hearing habeas peti-
tions from prisoners in Boumediene’s position. To understand this larger issue, we need to look at 
habeas itself. The writ of  habeas corpus provides collateral review of  detention.138 More simply, it 
allows a person detained outside the federal criminal system to argue their case in federal court.  Once 
the writ139 is granted, the detaining authority—in this case the U.S. military—must justify the deten-
tion to the court.140??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
prisoner released.141
The right to habeas is part of  the Constitution: “The privilege of  the Writ of  Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of  Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
131  Id. at 4-5.
132  Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 194 (D.D.C. 2008), reversed as to another party by Bensayah v. Obama, 610 
F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
133  Id. at 193.
134  Id. at 197.
135  Id.
136  Id. at 198.
137  Jilani, supra note 118.
138  17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261 (2011)
139  The “writ” is the order from the court to the person detaining the prisoner. Id.
140  Id.
141  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723, 779 (2008). There has been continuing controversy, though, about the 
power of  federal courts to order the Executive to resettle Guantanamo detainees into the United States when other 
resettlement offers are available. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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it.”142 However, the Bush administration moved the detainees in Guantanamo relying on the belief  
that, once placed in Guantanamo, the detainees would have no way to get into court.143 Despite 
this belief, the Supreme Court held that courts could hear habeas petitions from Guantanamo.144 But 
unlike in Boumediene???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
the Constitution.145 Because this holding was based only on the statute, Congress had the power to 
change it, and did. In 2006, Congress rewrote the habeas law to take the power to hear habeas peti-
tions from Guantanamo detainees away from federal courts. The new section provided that courts 
had no jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from aliens who had been “determined . . . to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant.”146
One of  the questions raised in Boumediene, then, was whether this law passed by Congress—a law 
that applied only to noncitizens—trumped the constitutional guarantee of  habeas. Like many cases 
in the national security line, the question posed in Boumediene mixes up membership and national 
security. The question, as framed by the Court, was whether the court could deny habeas to people 
with the following attributes: 1) aliens; 2) arrested abroad; 3) detained abroad and 4) deemed enemy 
combatants by the military.147
???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
used Boumediene to explain how substantive and membership factors interacted. In the end, though, 
the court did not separate membership from national security. Instead, the Court’s test took every 
factor into account, without explaining why they mattered or how to weigh them. In the Court’s 
words, the right to habeas depends on: (1) the citizenship and status of  the detainee and the ad-
equacy of  the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of  the sites 
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolv-
ing the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.148
Leaving aside the third factor, this test tells courts to look at both membership and national 
security. The nationality and location of  detainees matters, but so does their status as enemy com-
batants. But the test does not explain how or why membership matters. Presumably, an alien is less 
likely to get habeas than a citizen. Also presumably, someone outside the country is less likely to win 
the right than someone inside. 
142  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. 
143  Boumediene, 553 US at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144  Id. at 734 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004)).
145  Id.
146  See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2006), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)
147  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (2008). I should add two other criteria that could be relevant, but that the Court 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of  the detainee as an enemy combatant is controverted.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
some off. Id. The fact that some of  the Boumediene detainees had colorable claims as noncombatants distinguishes them 
from petitioners denied habeas in World War II cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ex Parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
148  Id. at 766.
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This absence—this lack of  a why—is telling.149 It happens, I think, because membership theory 
pushes the law towards strict binaries. Either outsiders are not part of  the social contract and get no 
rights, or they are part of  the social contract and get full rights.150 If  one accepts that outsiders get 
some rights, it is very hard to explain why they should not get every right. 
Using the three-part test, the Court concluded that 1) the military tribunals gave detainees rela-
tively little due process;151???? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
control of  the United States;152???????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
review was not an undue obstacle.153
Taking these facts into account, the majority held that the petitioners had the right to petition 
for habeas review.154 The nationality of  the detainees, once mentioned, thus disappears.155 All of  the 
detainees are foreign nationals, but all have the right to petition for habeas. And the particular nature 
of  Guantanamo—the fact that it is, in every respect but technically, part of  the United States—fac-
tors heavily.156 Under the terms of  its lease, the United States has complete control over Guantana-
mo for as long as it wants; there are no other military, police or legal forces within the jurisdiction.157
As the Court noted, “in every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant 
jurisdiction of  the United States.”158
This conclusion—that Guantanamo is a de facto part of  the United States—shines light on the 
membership dynamic. One way to get membership is to be inside the United States. Knowing this, 
the Bush Administration put the prisoners in Guantanamo, physically close but nominally outside 
the United States.159 One way to read Boumediene is as a repudiation not of  the decision to deny rights,
but of  the choice to deny rights somewhere close to the United States (both literally and legally). If  the 
politics of  the membership dynamic push the most questionable national security practices away 
from the United States—if  we are okay with the dark stuff, so long as we don’t have to see it—then 
the Court was correcting the Bush administration not for going to the dark side, but for doing it too 
close to home.
If  this is true—if  Boumediene endorses membership and not substance—then we will see that 
149  The Boumediene majority relies on history and doctrine—not theory—to support its holding. Id. at 727-59. As 
???? ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
the Constitution. See id. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Boumediene establishes that outsiders have access to habeas—a 
constitutional right—even when the political branches, acting together in the name of  national security, seek to deny that 
right. Id. at 797.
150  See infra Part III.A.
151  553 U.S. at 767.
152  Id at 768-69.
153  Id. at 769-70.
154  Id. at 771. 
155  Id.
156  Id. at 768-69.
157  Id. at 770.
158  Id at 69. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
159  Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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endorsement going forward.160 The key doctrinal question is whether habeas will be limited to the 
special—perhaps unique—circumstances of  Guantanamo.161 Here the most telling case so far is Al
Maqaleh v. Gates.162 The Al Maqaleh petitioners alleged they were captured outside of  and then trans-
????????????????????????????????????????????163 The D.C. Circuit held that these petitioners had 
no constitutional right to petition for habeas.164 While rejecting the position that Boumediene applied 
only to areas of  de facto sovereignty—and hence probably only Guantanamo—the court held that 
because Bagram is in an active theater of  war, it would be impracticable to allow habeas.165 But the 
court held out the possibility that the detainees’ might have the right to habeas—if  they could prove 
that the United States chose Bagram in order to “evade judicial review.”166 Seizing on this argument, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
detained in Bagram precisely for this reason.167
 Assuming that the petitioners can prove this—and I don’t know if  they can—the court’s 
response will tell us whether Boumediene is about membership or substance. If  the real gist of  Boume-
diene is that the national security exception applies outside the United States, then the fact that the 
United States is neither the de jure nor de facto sovereign of  Afghanistan is enough to deny rights. 
But, if  Boumediene is about substance—that is, if  it requires the government to have a good reason to 
treat outsiders differently—then moving a detainee just to avoid court cannot justify denying habeas. 
No matter what the cost of  providing habeas in Bagram is, the cost cannot justify denying rights 
when incurred for that reason.
III. MEMBERSHIP AS THEORY
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
this section I look at the reasons to treat outsiders differently, and argue that none justify the differ-
ence that we actually see. In order to make this argument I use the literature on extraterritoriality, 
which directly engages membership as theory. In doing so, I adapt Gerald Neuman’s categorization 
of  the theories of  rights for nonmembers.168
The existing literature on extraterritoriality fails to take into account that national security law 
160  Lower courts have thus far not been sympathetic to habeas petitions from national security detainees held abroad. 
See Developments, supra note 6, at 1260 .
161  For a good discussion of  de facto sovereignty see generally Anthony J. Colangelo, “De facto Sovereignty”: 
Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (2009) (explaining how the concept of  de facto sovereignty was 
used in Boumediene and ways in which it may be used in future litigation involving noncitizens in other situations of  
extraterritorial detention).
162  605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
163  Id. at 87.
164  Id.
165  Id. at 96-98.
166  Id. at 98.
167  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 2011 WL 666883, at *1-2 (D.D.C. 2011). As of  now, the court has not decided their 
petitions.
168  See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Neuman, 
Closing].
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???? ????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
political incentive to direct national security only at outsiders, national security has become some-
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
the same way to national security as anything else. There should be no carve-out of  the kind seen in 
al-Aulaqi for national security actions abroad. In this section I make my case for this vision of  equal-
ity, comparing it to other existing approaches.
A. Outsider as Nonperson: Membership
One approach to the rights of  outsiders is simply not to recognize them—to treat them as 
nonmembers. The membership approach treats places or individuals “as participating in a privileged 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
provisions.”169 It derives from the social-contract model.170 Citizens and people within the United 
States are parties to the contract.171 Nonmembers are not. Lacking a connection to the state, non-
members have no rights against it.172 For states slow to internalize natural rights or external con-
straints on their power—think the United States—the membership approach is Hobbesian in that it 
posits that states have no moral obligations to nonmembers.173
There is a lively historical debate about the membership approach and its role in U.S. history.174
169 Id. at 6-7. 
170 Social-contract theories—of  which there are many—view the state as the product of  agreements between people 
for mutual advantage. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, 6 (1996) [hereinafter NEUMAN, STRANGERS].
Individuals chose to leave nature and live under law in order to secure their rights. Id. at 9. Older scholars viewed these 
rights as natural, meaning inherent in personhood and thus pre-existing the creation of  the state. Id. at 10. Hobbes 
did not see the state as a means to secure natural rights, but rather as the original source of  rights. Id at 12. The state 
is the “basic unit” of  this contract—the parties to the contract are imagined as choosing principles for a state. Id. at 9. 
The legitimacy of  the state’s exercise of  power, and its monopoly on violence, is understood as a matter of  agreement; 
because the parties to the social contract have—either actually or hypothetically—agreed to bind themselves to it, the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of  Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) [hereinafter Cleveland, 
Powers].
171  Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 2, at 917.
172 Id.
173 Id??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
nonmembers. Id. at 923 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 360 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1985)). In practice, application 
?? ????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
Membership could extend only to citizens in U.S. territory, or to citizens wherever they are, or to all persons legally (or 
perhaps illegally) inside U.S. territory, or to all persons inside the territory and to all citizens abroad. Additionally, instead 
of  construing membership as an all-or-nothing proposition, one could see it as a spectrum, in which those at the edges 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, in which the Supreme Court stated that “The alien . . . has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of  
rights as he increases his identity with our society.” 339 U.S. 763, 770. But whatever the criteria for membership is, under 
any membership approach some people will fail this criteria and be excluded.
174 Compare J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 485 (2007) with
Cabranes supra note 6, Burnett supra note 6, and Cleveland, Embedded, supra note 6. 
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Because my interest is in politics, not history, I will defer to other scholars on this point. My main 
case against membership is simply a moral one. It seems wrong—deeply inconsistent with modern 
principles—to take most of  humanity and say they have no rights against U.S. power. Conceiving of  
these aliens abroad as rightless, or possessing only those rights guaranteed by statute or treaty, leaves 
some large and important swath of  state action unbounded by the protections available to citizens. 
Under a pure membership approach, nothing in the United States constitution would prevent the 
CIA from arresting or even killing foreign nationals abroad for merely criticizing United States 
foreign relations. It would allow a shadow-justice system in which foreign detainees were tried and 
executed on Navy ships and foreign army bases, regardless of  whether they were captured on the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????175
I think this basic incompatibility with our other values is why the Supreme Court has not em-
braced a pure membership approach either in the War on Terror cases176 or other contexts.177 Indeed, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
United States to torture or kill aliens abroad because they simply have no rights. Instead, those who 
argue for maximum executive power, such as John Yoo, have argued that the ability of  the President 
to treat aliens at his discretion derives from the Commander-in-Chief  power, and not the simple fact 
that aliens abroad never have constitutional rights.178
???????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(either the choice to be a citizen or to move into the territory) then aliens abroad should have no 
constitutional rights when they are involuntarily transported to the United States.179 Someone cap-
175  See NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 170, at 8 (“When the government acts outside the sphere of  municipal law, it 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
176  See generally???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
held at Guantanamo Bay and that noncitizens detained there were thus entitled to raise habeas corpus petitions against 
the U.S. government to challenge the legality of  their detentions).
177  In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the Court held that the government did not need to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement when searching the house of  a Mexican national in Mexico. 
The respondent, Verdugo-Urquidez, was alleged to have smuggled drugs into the United States. Id. at 262. At the behest 
?? ??????????????????????????????????? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. U.S. 
??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in its prosecution of  Verdugo-Urquidez in federal district court in the United States. Id. The Court held that the evidence 
obtained in Mexico was admissible, but stopped short of  holding that aliens abroad have no constitutional rights. 
Rather, Rehnquist’s majority opinion, which was joined by four judges, held simply that the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply in this case. Id. at 274-275. Justice Kennedy, who joined Rehnquist’s opinion while writing a separate concurrence 
justifying the holding, concluded that aliens abroad can possess constitutional rights, depending on the process due in a 
particular case. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy explicitly rejected a membership approach by noting “that 
the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.” 
Id. at 277.
178  See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2003). Yoo argues that the Commander-
in-Chief  clause vests “full control of  the military operations of  the United States to the President.” Id. at 1199. The 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
liberty’ of  prisoners of  war.” Id. at 1221.
179  NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 170, at 8. 
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tured abroad and dragged to the United States does not consent to that exercise of  power, even in 
a hypothetical sense.180 But aliens captured abroad do have procedural rights—the right to an attor-
ney, for instance—when tried in U.S. courts. We are not comfortable with the consequences of  pure 
membership when we have to confront them.181 This is why we try to push them away—to keep 
military detainees outside the United States, and to render suspects to other countries for torture. 
B. Outsider as Enemy
The outsider-as-enemy theory posits that loyalty and nationality run together. The theory sug-
gests that since foreign nationals are loyal to different states, they do not have rights against the 
United States. The enemy theory explains older statutes like the Enemy Alien Act, which authorizes 
the removal and detention of  foreign nationals of  states at war with the United States.182 It is consis-
tent with the original constitutional vision of  war as a battle between states, formalized by Congres-
sional declaration.183 Foreign nationals are loyal to their states, and when we are at war with a state, 
its foreign nationals are our enemies. As the Court explained about World War II detainees:184
It is war that exposes the relative vulnerability of  the alien’s status . . . disabilities this 
country lays upon the alien who becomes also an enemy are imposed temporarily as 
an incident of  war and not as an incident of  alienage . . . the alien enemy is bound by 
an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of  our 
enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards 
him as part of  the enemy resources.
The enemy theory, though, does not explain why outsiders receive fewer rights in post-9/11 
national security practice. The era of  declared wars is long gone; we now live in an era of  unilat-
eral Executive action and Congressional approval that is less than the previously requisite formal 
180 See id. Nor can the anti-subordination principle justify granting rights to someone who is in no way part of  the 
community that she would be subordinated to.
181 There is an instrumental argument for granting aliens captured abroad procedural rights in U.S. courts without 
recognizing that aliens abroad have rights generally: that federal courts should not get into the habit of  conducting trials 
without rights, lest that color their treatment of  citizens. But if  we accept this premise—that government bodies used 
to acting without constraint will do so even when acting against rights-bearers—then the instrumental argument pushes 
much more strongly in favor of  requiring bodies that exercise extraterritorial authority to observe rights. This is because 
as the risk of  terrorist attacks causing harm in the United States grows, so does the risk that these bodies will have an 
expanded domestic mandate. What happens, in other words, if  there is another big attack, and the CIA or military is 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ???????????????See, e.g., Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 
200 (1982)). If  that attack comes—if  a dirty bomb goes off  in New York—wouldn’t it be better if  the agencies that 
responded were used to observing some sort of  human rights?
182  50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006).
183  U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8.
184  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950).
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declaration of  war.185 Moreover, our enemies in the War on Terror are not states, but transnational 
organizations like al Qaeda.186 The War on Terror has been waged against citizens of  allied states.187
Even if  we accept that citizenship is relevant in a war against a non-state organization, the enemy 
theory does not explain differential treatment based on territoriality. Al-Aulaqi is dead despite being 
an American citizen.188 If  his citizenship somehow denoted his loyalty to the United States, then his 
rights should not have changed with his location.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
war against non-state actors. Anything a President could do to the Nazis, he could also do to al 
Qaeda, or so the argument goes.189 Taking this argument at face value, though, everything about it 
pushes away from membership, and towards?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????-
zens from many nations and that operate in different countries, then nationality and territory should 
matter less.
It is worth taking a moment here to think about the change from declared wars between states 
to the War on Terror The shift is not caused by al Qaeda, or any other enemy. Rather the change is 
caused by new technology. New weapons—predator drones, dirty bombs, poisonous gases—have 
made it easier to kill. The Internet also makes it easier to cause harm.190
This new technology has made threat more diffuse. It comes from more people and places—not 
just states, but also small groups of  people, and even individuals. And because threat is more diffuse, 
it is also less territorial. People can cause mass harm now without needing to control much territory. 
They can launch a devastating attack while living in the targeted country. 
Consider these new threats. There is the risk of  chemical attack, like the sarin gas used on the 
Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult,191 or a biological attack, like anthrax sent through 
???? ????????????????? ?????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
185  See generally????????????????????????? ??????????Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1789, 1821-36 (2010).
186  See, e.g.?????????????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????U.S.C. §1541 
(2006) (authorizing the Executive to use force against the perpetrators of  the 9/11 attacks and associated forces). 
187  See, e.g., Rachel Bronson, Rethinking Religion: The Legacy of  the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, 28:4 WASH. Q. 121, 121 (2005) 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
188  Supra Part II.A.
189  See, e.g??????????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????U.S.C. §1541 (2006). 
The President reads the AUMF to include the right to detain those “who were part of, or substantially supported, 
Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.” Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at 
Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
190 The Internet enables direct attacks on infrastructure—power grids and the like—but also allows people to share 
information, coordinate attacks over long distances, and encrypt communications.
191  Twelve people died. See Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Toward State 
Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95, 96 (2005). Another biological attack—less famous, but 
also frightening—occurred when the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon deliberately infected over 750 people with salmonella by 
sprinkling it on salad bars. See id. at 102.
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cials are still not certain.192 If  so, he or she managed to terrify the United States using its own facili-
ties.193
There is also the threat of  a nonstate nuclear attack. This risk is very low, but it is not zero.194
The international weapons market has become more commoditized.195 While it is probably true that 
only a state (or a state-sponsored group) can build a nuclear weapon, it is not entirely clear that state-
created nuclear weapons, and the ability to use them, will never fall into the hands of  violent non-
state actors.196
Beyond weapons proliferation, the simple fact of  globalization changes the threat. Countries are 
now linked in new ways by electric grids, transportation technology, and the Internet. This infra-
structure also presents new threats. The best examples are the 9/11 attacks, in which planes, not 
weapons, were used. Or rather, planes were used as weapons.
The state is therefore “losing its monopoly over the means of  mass destruction.”197 As Bruce 
Ackerman wrote: 
The root of  our problem is not . . . any ideology, but the free market in death. If  the 
Middle East were . . . transformed into a[n] . . . oasis of  peace and democracy, fringe 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ????????????
blasted the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, others will want to detonate suitcase 
A-bombs as they become available.198
These changes herald not only a shift away from war as a contest between states, but also as a 
shift away from war as a territorial phenomenon. In a conventionally waged war, the point was to 
control territory—to establish a local monopoly on the use of  force (which, after all, is what govern-
ments do, according to Locke).199 This is what World War II looked like. But if  technology is chang-
ing so that controlling territory is less correlated with preventing mass harm—if  chemical weapons 
can be made in basements as well as state laboratories,200—then national security will focus less on 
controlling territory. Imagine a set of  threats to the United States, some real and some perceived, 
whose response is not control of  enemy territory but rather a targeted used of  force. Sometimes 
192  Pierre Thomas, et al., “Anthrax Scientist Kills Himself  as FBI Closes In,” ABCNews (Aug. 1, 2008), http://abcnews.
go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5494971 (last visited November 12, 2011) [hereinafter Thomas, “Anthrax Suspect.”].
193  There is some evidence that the anthrax attacker was a U.S. employee. See id. This threat—of  states losing control 
?? ????? ??????? ? ????????????????????????? ????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ??????????????????????
Pakistan’s consent. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT at 73-80 (2008) (hereinafter BOBBITT, TERROR).
194  BOBBITT, TERROR, 98-124.
195  Id.
196  Id.
197  Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 478 (2006).
198  Id.
199  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 111 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale 
Univ. Press 2003) (1689).
200  See BOBBITT, TERROR, supra note 193 at 189-206. 
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the threat will come from inside the United States and sometimes from outside. But the hallmark of  
these threats will be the government claim that the stakes are as high as in territorial war—thousands 
(or more) will die if  the government does not respond. 
Every aspect of  this change—the rise in threat from non-state actors, the decreased relevance of  
territoriality—pushes away from membership. If  we are enemies with al Qaeda, then membership 
in al Qaeda, and not foreign citizenship, should make one subject to the national security exception. 
Jose Padilla, the alleged al Qaeda member and U.S. citizen, should have been shipped to Guanta-
namo.201 And if  the relevance of  territoriality is diminished—if  someone inside the United States 
can now cause as much damage as a foreign army, and the United States can now target individuals 
anywhere in the world with missiles—then it should matter less whether people are inside or outside 
the country.
C. Universalism
Universalism is the view that rights should “be interpreted as applicable to every person and at 
every place.”202 This does not mean that location should never be taken into account. Under a uni-
?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
account, but only in the same manner as pragmatic limitations inside the country.203
The fundamental proposition underlying universalism is simple. If  we believe that human rights 
are inherent in the person, then it would be odd for these rights to disappear because of  place.
Indeed, it seems absurd that essential human freedoms should differ depending on where they are 
enforced.
The difference between universalism and the equality view that I endorse is that universalism 
suggests some minimal standard of  treatment due all people, while equality demands only that 
people be treated the same wherever they are. In practice, universalism—which demands a set of  
minimal rights that applies to everyone everywhere—is tied to international law. It is only through 
a system of  law that transcends state-based guarantees that universal minimums can be established. 
International humanitarian law and international human-rights law are both expressions of  universal 
visions.
Both the theory and doctrine of  universalism are well worked out.204 But the politics are not. 
The world is still looking for a way to enforce universal norms against noncompliant states, includ-
201  See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
202  Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 2, at 916.
203  Id. Kal Raustiala has similarly expressed the view that there is no “inherent spatial dimension to the law.” Raustiala, 
Geography, supra note 6, at 2550 (emphasis added). I should add that Raustiala is not a universalist. His approach does 
“not demand that all rules apply identically on all places.” Id. at 2551. Instead, spatial distinctions apply when the legal 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
comity. Id. In application, this approach would require a right-by-right inquiry into the appropriateness of  extraterritorial 
application, but the party advocating for territorial limitations would bear the burden of  proving their relevance. In this 
regard, Raustiala’s approach resembles that global due-process approach, except that it would shift the burden to make 
extraterritorial possession of  rights the default.
204  See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE at 228-68 (2006).
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ing the United States.205 Universalism is thus a theory without an institutional structure to enforce it. 
In this context, we can consider calls for universalism, instantiated by the many arguments that U.S. 
courts should apply international humanitarian law to the war on terror, as another form of  poli-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
results they want.
Equality presents itself  as an alternative not because it is normatively better, but because it is 
the theory that is most likely to sway U.S. courts—the branch that is, in the near term, most likely to 
restrict the war power. 
D. Global Due Process
Under the global-due-process approach, the government must observe “fundamental” rights 
when it acts abroad, but only when their application would not be “impracticable and anomalous.”206
Global due process is a loose sort of  pragmatism that recognizes the rights of  aliens abroad when 
those rights seem important and the cost of  recognizing them not unduly substantial.207
While there is a role for pragmatism in determining the rights of  aliens abroad, the global-due 
process approach overemphasizes pragmatism by tying the existence of  the right to pragmatic consider-
ations. It would be better to recognize that aliens abroad always have rights against U.S. power, but 
that the possibility of  enforcing those rights can be limited by pragmatic considerations in the same 
way that they can limit the possibility of  enforcing rights at home. Just as Fourth Amendment rights 
may be waived when exigencies prevent obtaining a warrant,208 so might the warrant requirement be 
????????????????? ????????????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????209 This differs 
from the view that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to aliens or people abroad because 
it is not “fundamental.”
205  See infra Part IV.B.  
206  Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 
2076 (2005) [hereinafter Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights].
207  The idea that aliens abroad can enforce only their fundamental rights is derived from ideas contained in the 
Insular Cases, in which the courts considered rights of  people in the United States territories acquired in the Spanish 
American War. See generally Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). The Insular Cases therefore do not concern the 
rights of  aliens abroad, because the United States was sovereign over the territories in question, and some of  the cases 
concerned citizens. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 308 (1922). Nevertheless, they introduced the idea that there is 
some class of  people who are entitled to only fundamental rights. Applying this approach, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the right to jury trial was not fundamental. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1904); Balzac v. Porto 
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309-311 (1922). But later cases considering territorial possessions have extended other rights, 
including Due Process and Equal Protection Rights. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 n.5 
(1974)(extending the constitutional right of  due process to Puerto Rico); Examining Bd. of  Eng’rs v. Otero, 426 U.S. 
572, 600 (1976) (holding that a Puerto Rican law providing that only citizens could be engineers was unconstitutional). It 
is probably unwise to extrapolate too much from these cases, as each territory has a different relationship to the United 
States.
208  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978). 
209  See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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E. Mutuality of  Obligation
Developed by Professor Neuman, the mutuality of  obligation approach recognizes the rights 
of  aliens abroad when they are subjected to U.S. power for violating existing law.210 It is theoretically 
grounded in the view that “constitutional rights and limitations [are] necessary to justify the exercise 
of  governing power.”211 The U.S. must therefore recognize rights whenever there is an “assertion of  
an obligation to obey U.S. law.”212
The mutuality approach—and others that rely on it213??????????????????? ?????????????????????
continuous with social-contract theory. They are also more doctrinally consistent with U.S. law in 
that they recognize that the United States has never, before Boumediene, recognized the rights of  
aliens abroad against a claimed use of  the war power. We can also take the mutuality approach, 
which Neuman has defended,214????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
outsiders. The mutuality approach recognizes the rights of  outsiders any time a claim is made under 
law. Given the increasing frequency of  laws that have extra territorial application—under, for in-
stance, environmental215 and antitrust216 law—recognition of  rights for outsiders under claims of  law 
would accomplish a lot. 
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????-
tended to exclude extraterritorial use of  force grounded in the war power. In the national security 
context, rights claims are often asserted against Executive action. The military may arrest someone 
in Bosnia and imprison him in Bagram, or the CIA could admit that it is trying to kill someone in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
he broke the law. So rights are not available against these actions.
This is problematic in the same way that the membership approach is. If  the political branches 
choose to target outsiders under the national security power, the targets have no rights. With insid-
ers, though, the political branches are bound to honor the Constitution, even if  they choose not 
210  Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights, supra note 206, at 2077.
211  Neuman, Closing, supra note 168, at 7.
212  Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights, supra note 206, at 2077.
213 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edge”: Sovereignty, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the 
Reach of  the U.S. Constitution in the Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 (2006); David R. Chludzinski, A
Most Certain Tragedy, but Reason Enough to Side-Step the Constitution and Values of  the United States?, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
227, 246 (2004).
214  Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights, supra note 206, at 2076-77.
215 See generally Randall S. Abate, Dawn of  a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of  U.S. Environmental Statutes: A 
Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of  Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87 (2006).
216 See generally?????? ??????????? ????????????How to Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing: Using Extraterritorial 
Application of  the Antitrust Laws as a Deterrence Mechanism, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 813 (2008).
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to claim that the suspects violated the law.217 If, for instance, the military picks up a citizen in the 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a claim of  violation of  law. The Constitution applies presumptively.218
The mutuality approach thus gives the political branches discretion over the national security ex-
ception for outsiders, but not insiders. Like membership, then, the mutuality approach risks creating 
a national security exception that is directed only at outsiders.219
If  mutuality220 presents a trade, it is one that progressives should not take. Conceding that 
the value of  securing rights against claims under the law is high, the cost of  allowing the political 
branches free reign when claiming use of  the war power abroad is higher. In part, this is because 
mutuality presumably envisions that international law will restrain extraterritorial use of  the U.S. war 
power, when for the most part it has not.221 But the bigger problem with creating a carve-out for the 
United States when it claims the war power abroad is that we don’t really know what that power is.
The mutuality approach, in other words, would make sense if  we knew the limits of  the war 
power. But we do not. The national security exception is, in a deep sense, still up for grabs, even 
when applied to citizens at home. To the question of  whether the Executive can detain a U.S. citi-
zen captured in the U.S. under the AUMF, the answer is maybe.222 To say that the Executive can do 
abroad what it can’t do at home is to assume that we know what it can do at home. But we do not. 
The laws of  extraterritoriality and national security are not just evolving, but coevolving. Treat-
ments of  one that don’t deal with the other are incomplete. In the real world, membership and 
national security come bundled. The question in Boumediene was whether habeas was available to alien 
???? ????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
constitutional rights, both because Guantanamo is entirely controlled by the United States, Neuman, Closing, supra note 
168 at 39-40, and because they are entitled to it under the doctrinally prevalent global due-process approach. Id. at 44-51. 
But he has not argued that they have rights under a mutuality approach.
218  This does not mean that the citizen will win his release—that is still an open question—but rights would not turn 
on whether the Executive claimed that the detainee violated law. Instead it would turn on the substantive scope of  the 
national security power.
219  One can imagine a system in which courts second-guessed the Executive decision not to justify the use of  power 
by claiming that the subject of  that power violated a law. But that system would inevitably devolve into one like the 
system I am proposing. If  courts reviewed executive detention to determine whether the Executive was empowered to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
220  In the same vein, Judge José A. Cabranes has argued that the availability of  extraterritorial criminal-procedure 
rights should be tied to: “(1) whether the power exercised by the government is one that can only be exercised abroad; 
(2) the extent of  the connection to the United States of  those acted upon overseas; (3) whether the challenged 
government action presents a risk of  irreparable injustice; (4) the practical limitations on enforcing the constitutional 
provision in question; and (5) the absence of  any categorical rule to determine whether a particular provision of  the 
Constitution should have extraterritorial force.” Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1698. One of  the powers that “can only be 
exercised abroad” is the war power. Id. at 1700-1701. This approach is troubling in the same way that mutuality is: it 
creates too much judicial deference to use of  the war power abroad.
221  See infra Part IV.B.  
222  See ????????????????????????? ???????Resolving Ambiguities? Yes. Dramatically Expanding Existing Detention Authority? 
No., LAWFARE (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/resolving-ambiguities-yes-dramatically-expanding-
existing-detention-authority-no/.
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enemy combatants captured and detained abroad.223 Congress, when passing a law justifying national 
security practices, can choose to target only aliens. The Executive, when exercising its considerable 
discretion, can choose to treat outsiders differently. The courts can choose to use other doctrines—
like the political-question doctrine—as proxies for territoriality. And so on. In each of  these cases, 
membership presents an out???????????????????????????????????????????
F. Equality 
Courts should require the political branches to treat outsiders equally against the national secu-
rity power. While there may be pragmatic reasons to treat outsiders differently—such as the inability 
to use normal criminal enforcement—the fact that someone is an alien or abroad should not, by 
itself, justify different treatment.
This is political-process argument. Political-process arguments are familiar in the domestic 
constitutional context. They posit that judicial review should be deployed against “systemic biases 
in legislative decision making rather than against the outputs of  a properly functioning political 
system.”224 One kind of  bias justifying heightened judicial scrutiny is “‘prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities.”225
This kind of  discrimination signals problems with policy. A discriminatory law must be wrong 
to at least one party. If  a law making it illegal to operate a laundry in a wooden building is only 
enforced against Chinese people, and not whites,226 then it is suspect. If  the law is a good one—if, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ????????????
a pretext to target an unpopular group—then it should not have been passed at all. Either way, the 
differential treatment tells us something is wrong. 
Similarly, we are either militarily detaining too many outsiders or too few insiders. The same goes 
for extraordinary rendition, preventive nonmilitary detention, and targeted killing. We either do it 
too little at home, or too much abroad. If  this difference were explained by pragmatic reasons—if  
it were impossible to avoid national security measures against every outsider subject to the U.S. 
national security power—then there would be less cause for suspicion. But this is not the case. The 
United States had a legal pathway to go after Boumediene and his cohorts.227 That pathway failed, 
so the country used national security measures. Six years later, when Boumediene made it out of  the 
national security system, it became apparent that there was not a lot of  evidence against him.228 If  he 
had been a U.S. citizen inside the United States, he would not have had to suffer for so long. More-
????????????????? ??????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????????????????-
223 See supra Part II.E.
224  Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 747 (1991); See also JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
225  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
226 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
227 See supra Part II.E.
228 Id.
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lar minorities misses discrimination against other groups, such as women (who are not minorities).229
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ??????????????????????
substantive commitment.230
I take these critiques to be correct. To the extent that invidious racial or religious discrimination 
infects national security law—say, in discriminatory Executive targeting of  Arab or Islamic men231—
my approach will not solve it. That said, a policy-perfecting approach can solve the problem of  
access to courts.
 From a simple equity standpoint, this would be a good thing. It does not discount the problems 
of  our criminal justice system to suggest that outsiders would do better in court than at the mercy 
of  the political branches. The wrongfully imprisoned Al-Kidd, released after sixteen days, was better 
off  than el-Masri, who was tortured and dumped on a hillside.
Equality is also the right policy response to the technological shifts that are pulling us from terri-
torial war. When controlling territory is less linked to threat, legal status should be less linked to ter-
ritory. If  threat no longer comes just from enemy states, then nationality should matter less. There is 
a case that national security practices should change in response to new technologies (although I do 
not think this means we need to give up on civil liberties). The challenge is to fashion responses to 
new threats that protect rights while allowing the government to respond to the increased chance of  
mass harm. But with the partial exception of  the PATRIOT Act, this has not happened.232 Instead, 
we have decided to give few rights to outsiders without reconsidering the national security regime at 
home. 
Equity offers to break this pattern. But for liberals (and I am one), equality is a risk. Leveling 
rights between outsiders and insiders could cause a leveling up for outsiders, but it also might level 
insiders down. Because my aim is to preserve (and limit) the war power not by unleashing it only 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
panded use of  the war power at home. This could be consistent with expanded executive power, al-
though need not be. The most egalitarian vision of  national security law yet offered was in the early 
days of  the Bush Administration, when it proposed that the Constitution gave the Executive unilat-
229  “Long after discrete and insular minorities have gained strong representation at the pluralist bargaining table, 
?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that are discrete and diffuse (like women), or anonymous and somewhat insular (like homosexuals), or both diffuse 
and anonymous (like the victims of  poverty).” Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 
742 (1985).
230  “[T[here are constitutional values in our scheme of  government even more fundamental than perfected 
pluralism—most notably, those that bar prejudice against racial and religious minorities.” Id. at 746; see also Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of  Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1076-77 (1980). 
231  See supra Part II.D.  
???? ??????????????????? ??????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(2006).
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eral authority when using the Commander-in-Chief  power.233 Under the unitary-executive theory, the 
President could suspend the rights of  citizens as well as aliens.234
This vision has not prevailed. Nor do I think it will. My hope is that, when faced with a choice 
between more or fewer rights, the public will choose the former. The more courts are empowered to 
look at Executive action abroad, the more it will become apparent that rights-based approaches are 
consistent with safety. But I could be wrong. That said, I do not see a better way forward. 
IV. MEMBERSHIP AND SUBSTANCE




U.S. action, but, as I argue, it is not substantive. And international law, while substantive, does not 
??????????????????????????????????????
A. Congressional Authorization Is Not Substantive
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
based on Congressional authorization. This practice is part of  our constitutional architecture. Article 
I § 8 gives Congress the power to declare war.235 This assignment of  power works with the allocation 
of  the Commander-in-Chief  power, to the President236 to split the war power between branches.
The main Congressional authority for post-9/11 national security practices is the Authorization 
for Use of  Military Force (AUMF).237 The AUMF authorizes the President to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed” the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as 
well as those who “aided or . . . harbored” the attackers.238 Courts, for the most part, have accepted 
233 See The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations 
Supporting Them, 2001 WL (OLC) 34726560, at *19 (Sept. 25, 2001) (“Military actions need not be limited to 
those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the 
Constitution vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups or organizations that cannot be demonstrably 
linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the security of  the United States and 
the lives of  its people, whether at home or overseas. . . . These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President 
alone to make.”).
234 See generally id.
235 U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8.
236 U.S. CONST. Art. II § 2.
237  Authorization for Use of  Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF]. 
The President reads the AUMF to include the right to detain those “who were part of, or substantially supported, 
Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.” Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at 
Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
238 AUMF, 115 Stat. at 224. 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????239 The doctrinal question of  whether mili-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9/11 terrorists required by the AUMF.240 The same may be true with targeted killing.241
While the AUMF does provide some justiciable constraint on the Executive, these constraints 
are not substantive. The AUMF does not tell us what the Executive can or cannot do. It merely ap-
proves “all necessary and appropriate force.”242 We can take this to mean that Congress has granted 
the Executive all the power Congress itself  has. This delegation is constitutional,243 but it would be 
more appropriate if  Congress actually weighed in itself. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????-
ment. Rather, it targets a particular set of  enemies: the 9/11 attackers and those connected to 
them.244 It is as if  Congress authorized a particular topic of  dubious constitutionality—say, war-
rantless wiretaps—against one drug cartel and no others. This does not tell us what can be done 
and why. It only tells us who we can do it to—not in general, forward-looking terms, but only in 
response to past attack.
This approach—of  picking an enemy, instead of  a threat—makes sense if  we think of  post-
9/11 practices as war. Wars are waged against enemies. Congress could declare war against Germany, 
which would authorize military trial and detention of  German enemy combatants.245 Yet what is now 
occurring is not precisely war. Instead, we have the “war on terror,” a new hybrid. Unlike war, we 
do not know what the “war on terror” is. No constitutional framer asked whether the United States 
could use a drone to kill a suspected terrorist, who happens to be a U.S. citizen living in an allied 
country (but in a region that is not under allied control).246 Even military detention—a traditional in-





ror.249 The Executive—the body charged with enforcing the law, not making it—is constitutionally 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
239  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
240  See, e.g., Al Alwi v. Obama, No. 09–5125, 2011 WL 2937134, at *10 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011).
241  See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Bobby Chesney, The AQ-AQAP Distinction, 
State Secrets, and the Al-Aulaki Suit, LAWFARE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/10/the-aq-aqap-
distinction-state-secrets-and-the-al-aulaki-suit/.
242  AUMF., 115 Stat. at 224.
243  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-25.
244  See AUMF, 115 Stat. at 224..
245  See generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
246  See supra Part II.A.
247  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-25 .
248  This question is not hypothetical—it was the position of  Boumediene. See supra Part II.E.
249  Both the AUMF and Military Commissions Act, as I have argued, are not limits on Executive Power but rather 
endorsements of  them. See supra Part II.B.   
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This leaves the judiciary to police the war power. We should not be surprised that it has. There 
has to be some end to what the political branches can do in the name of  war. The President cannot 
kill U.S. citizens on U.S. soil without due process on mere allegations of  terrorism.250 Or, to give a 
more far-fetched hypo, I do not think the President can constitutionally kill people for opposing the 
war.251
I do not think this point is doctrinally controversial.252??????????????????????????????????????? -
it of  the war power.253 This is consistent with its basic function. The Constitution limits the power 
of  each branch of  the government. The Court interprets the Constitution. This means, for instance, 
deciding what “commerce” is.254 The Court will, and should, also decide what “war” is.255 It would be 
strange if  it did otherwise.
With Congress having dropped out of  the debate, and the Supreme Court left to police the out-
er edges of  the war power, the country is in a strange position. A few large cases—notably, Hamdi
and Boumediene—raise foundational questions, but neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has 
stepped in to answer them. This has left the issue to the lower courts. As Benjamin Wittes, Bobby 
Chesney, and Rabea Benhalim have noted:
This peculiar delegation of  a major legislative project to the federal courts arose be-
cause of  the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision that the courts have jurisdiction to hear 
??????????? ??????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?????? ????????? ?? ?? ?? ???????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????????
of  either the government’s detention authority or the procedures associated with the 
challenges it authorized. . . . Combined with the passivity of  the political branches in 
??????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ??????????
questions in the hands of  the federal district court judges in Washington and the ap-
pellate judges who review their work.256
Boumediene???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
250  See supra Part II.A.
251  C.f., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-27 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment grants the right to criticize 
the draft even using offensive language). I am using a slippery-slope argument here—always a dubious tactic—but in 
response to an equally dubious premise: that the war power has no justiciable limit.
252  The Bush Administration disagreed. See The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations 
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 2001 WL (OLC) 34726560, at *19 (Sept. 25, 2001). 
253  See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525-39 (2004). 
254  U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8. 
255  Id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
256  RABEA BENHALIM ET. AL., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 1 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.aspx.
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step of  asking—both in opinions257 and while off  the bench258—for more guidance. But I do not 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The political branches respond to this pressure by targeting outsiders. The risks of  using those prac-
tices—of  beating, killing or imprisoning without trial— fall mostly on aliens and people outside the 
country, who have little or no power to push back. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, does not want 
to provide substantive guidance either. This is consistent with a policy-perfecting role. The Court 
seeks not to create national security policy but rather to create the best conditions for Congress to 
create that policy.
Future events might change this political dynamic. A large terrorist attack by insiders might 
prompt Congress to reconsider the applications of  national security practices at home. I hope this 
does not happen. But if  it does, it would be better to have the legal architecture necessary to re-
spond in place before it happens, and not after. 
?????????????????????????? ????????????? ??????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it is not substantive. International law, conversely, is substantive,259?????????????????????????????????
security exception.260 This is because international law lacks “a pervasive and effective enforcement 
mechanism.”261 Conceding this, international-law scholars argue that states comply with international 
law for other reasons, including moral suasion, the need for legitimacy, the habit  of  compliance,262
257  See, e.g???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
cases arise, it is important to ask whether a court-driven process is best suited to protecting both the rights of  the 
petitioners and the safety of  our nation.”).
258  See, e.g., Judge A. Raymond Randolph, Speech to the Heritage Foundation: The Guantanamo Mess (Oct 20, 
2010), available at http://www.heritage.org/Events/2010/10/Guantanamo-Mess (addressing the many questions still left 
unanswered by the Boumediene case). 
259  See generally Monica Hakimi,??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ?????????????
Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369 (2008) (discussing that international law offers three models for the detention 
of  terrorism suspects each of  which employs some level of  human rights, criminal, and administrative law); Sean 
D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of  Persons 
Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants,” 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105 (2007) (reasoning that the broad international laws of  war 
established by the Geneva Conventions allow the law to adapt to the changed environment of  terrorism). 
260  I mean this descriptively, not normatively. I think it would be better—politically, prudentially and theoretically—
if  U.S. national security policy were more constrained by international law. This point is not novel—it is in fact very 
common—so I will not press the argument.
261  See Michael P. Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 321, 322 (2009) (“Lacking 
a pervasive and effective enforcement mechanism, scholars and policy makers have pondered whether international law 
is really binding law.”). For an excellent summary of  the “compliance debate” in international law, see id. at 322-41 (2009).
262  See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2614 (1997) 
(discussing the post-World War II move towards implementing international institutions based on multilateral treaties 
that allocated responsibility among the transnational members to construct international laws); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (stating nations’ compliance with international law is greatly dependent on 
the legitimacy of  the nations and their institutions).
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reciprocity costs263 and the prospects of  prosecution for violating international law. 264 These pres-
sures lead to the internalization of  international law in U.S. decision makers.265
Even those who argue that states have reasons to comply with international law do not argue 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of  internationalist writing is to critique the United States for its failure to comply with international 
law.266 And while the Executive purports to comply with international law (and has from the start of  
the war on terror),267 a body charged with interpreting the law it enforces will not, in the long run, 
be a neutral arbiter of  that law. The Bush Administration notoriously acted on its interpretation of  
international law to support waterboarding and other putatively unlawful treatment of  detainees,268
even though this interpretation was later repudiated by the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteurs on Torture and Arbitrary Detention, the U.K. House of  Commons, the International 
Committee of  the Red Cross, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, among oth-
ers.269
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????270 does not constrain it as domes-
tic law does. There was no international body stopping the U.S from targeting al-Aulaqi. Nor does 
international law provide a simple way for those harmed by U.S. power to remedy that harm. 
263  Scharf, supra note 261, at 357 (“[C]oncern for prosecution in third States or international tribunals under the 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
264  Id. (“[W]hen U.S. courts interpret international law as a limit to Executive Power . . . we are seeing the  concrete 
effects of  internalization of  international law by a disaggregated State.”).
265  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of  State, Speech to the Annual Meeting of  the American 
Society of  International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010), available at http://
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm [hereinafter “Koh Speech”], (describing the efforts of  the Obama 
Administration to support international courts and comply with the requirements of  the law of  war).
266  See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of  Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment 
and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359 (2009) (concluding the members of  the Bush Administration 
responsible for the forced disappearance of  persons and other war crimes should be held civilly liable for their actions); 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myths of  the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 
538 (2006)(contending the Bush Administration’s policies were based on erroneous and contradictory legal analyses that 
abused international humanitarian law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, ???????????????????? ??????????????????, 66 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 1231 (2005)(describing the Bush Administration’s application of  wartime privileges in response to Al Qaeda attacks 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
267  See Jack Goldsmith, Detention, the AUMF, and the Bush Administration—Correcting the Record, LAWFARE (September 14, 
2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/detention-the-aumf-and-the-bush-administration-correcting-the-record/ 
(explaining that the Obama Administration’s legal rationale for military detention does not differ much from that of  the 
Bush Administration because both administrations have derived their powers from the AUMF).
268  Scharf, supra??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
269  Id. at 356 (stating the named organizations all believed that the U.S. treatment of  detainees was inconsistent with 
international law).
270  But see JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing States’ comply with 
international law in an effort to preserve their interests in the international arena).
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International law can become the law of  the land.271 But Congress has the power to alter domes-
tic application of  treaties and abrogate federal common law.272 There are arguments that internation-
al law should apply domestically even against contrary congressional or executive action. But these 
arguments have failed in U.S. courts.273
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
can change the law. This has already happened in the Guantanamo cases. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,274
the Supreme Court held that the Geneva Conventions covered Guantanamo detainees because Con-
gress had, by statute, incorporated them into U.S. law.275 In response, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act, providing that alien unlawful enemy combatants tried under the statute may not 
use the Geneva Conventions in court.276 There is an argument about whether Congress can lawfully 
do this,277 but U.S. courts would likely take Congress’s side in this argument.278
In addition to being law itself, international law can also guide the interpretation of  U.S. law. 
Courts are required to interpret domestic law consistently with international law.279 The Obama 
Administration has concluded that the AUMF should be interpreted in light of  the laws of  war.280
No matter the interpretive impact of  international law, though, its power to constrain the political 
branches is limited by the fact that they can alter its domestic application. This is why the most im-
portant case in the Guantanamo line—Boumediene—hinges on constitutional law rather than interna-
271  See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 111 cmt. d (1987) (“Treaties made under the authority of  the United 
States, like the Constitution and the laws of  the United States, are expressly declared to be the ‘supreme Law of  the 
Land’ by Article VI of  the Constitution.”); §115 cmt. e (1987) (“Since any treaty or other international agreement of  the 
United States, and any rule of  customary international law, is federal law (§111), it supersedes inconsistent State law or 
policy whether adopted earlier or later.”).
272  See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); see also THIRD RESTATMENT, supra note 11, at § 
115(1) (the alteration of  an international law’s domestic application does not affect the United States’ international 
commitments).
273  THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 115(1) (delineating when an act of  Congress may supersede an 
international agreement); see also???????? ?????????????????????Executive Power v. International Law????? ??????????????????
Pol’y 73, 75 (2006) (“It appears that no federal court of  appeals has ever held that customary international law limits 
presidential decisions.”).
274  548 U.S. 557 (2004).
275  Id. at 613, 628-32. 
276  10 U.S.C. § 948b(e) (2006) (“No alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial under this chapter may 
invoke the Geneva Conventions as a basis for a private right of  action.”). For an excellent discussion of  the effect of  
this provision see Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L
L. 322 (2006) (discussing the criticism the Military Commissions Act has drawn for its restriction on the habeas corpus 
review and its treatment of  the Geneva Conventions).
277  See Bradley, supra note 276, at 337-41 (raising the question of  whether the Geneva Conventions were intended to 
be judicially enforceable).
278  Id. at 337-44 (reaching the conclusion that Congress has the right to override treaties for purposes of  U.S. law 
under the “last-in-time rule”).
279  Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of  Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of  nations if  any other possible construction remains.”).
280  See Koh Speech, supra note 265, at B(1)(b) “[W]e are resting our detention authority on a domestic statute- the 
2001 Authorization for Use of  Military Force (AUMF)- as informed by the principles of  the laws of  war.”). 
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tional law.
International law can bind the political branches when used as a guide to interpreting the consti-
tution. 281 It is in this role, as guide to the Constitution, that international law will most likely affect 
U.S. national security policy. This is not because it is theoretically sounder. Rather, it is pitched in a 
rhetoric that is more amenable to judiciary, the branch most likely to recognize outsiders’ rights. 
V. MEMBERSHIP AS POLITICS
Here I want to make a political argument. I put it forth as conjecture. Hopefully it is useful even 





tional security, simply decided that it is something we do to aliens and people outside the country. If
this is true, it is hard to see why those branches would change.
Outsiders are politically less powerful than insiders. Aliens cannot vote in U.S. elections even 
when they reside in the United States. People outside the country are mostly noncitizens. And citi-
zens outside the country, who retain the rights to vote, are not a politically united body in any way 
that would allow them to mobilize on issues relevant to them as a class. There is no natural constitu-
ency, in other words, that would have objected to the targeting of  Al-Aulaqi, on the basis of  “extra-
territorial rights.”
When it comes to national security, outsiders have less clout than in other contexts. The larger 
politics of  immigration policy create proxies for the interests of  noncitizens in the national debate. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pressure Congress to consider the views of  economic immigrants.282 This representation is imper-
fect, but it is more than what outsiders subject to the national security power currently have. The 
281 The U.S. Constitution does not expressly require consultation with international law, unlike, for instance, the 
South African constitution. Judith Resnik, ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
Nation State, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 33, 43-45 (2008) (comparing South Africa’s implementation of  international law to 
that of  the U.S.); S. Afr. Const. (1996) pmbl., ch. 2, § 39 (declaring courts must consider democratic society’s values, 
international law; and may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of  Rights). But, as Professor Sarah Cleveland 
has noted, international law is threaded through the Constitution. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International 
Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006) [Hereinafter Cleveland, International]. Most obviously, “war” is a term of  art 
in the Constitution. See supra Part IV.A.  And international law has informed courts’ reading of  this term. Cleveland, 
International, at 20-27; see also Vladeck, supra note 4.
282 See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, On Elián and the Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y, 343, 367-68 (2010) (stating Latinos and Asians will soon achieve the majority status in the U.S. and will 
then be able to effectively change immigration policy if  they so choose).
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largest single block subject to national security practices are Arab and Muslim men; they were over-
whelmingly the subjects of  preventive detention after 9/11.283 But Arab and Muslim U.S. citizens are 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????284 even assuming that they constitute 
a voting block for these purposes (and I do not know that they do).
As for people outside the country, there are obvious reasons that they won’t form a cohesive 
political unit. They are divided by language and culture. Consider the actual targets of  U.S. national 
security practices. There is no large domestic voting block whose interests are aligned with Khaled 
el-Masri—no U.S. voter whose fear of  extraordinary rendition would make them insist on limiting 
government power. No citizen at home will be rendered to torture.
The relative powerlessness of  outsiders also exacerbates the tendency of  Congress to defer to 
the Executive in the use of  the national security power. Some scholars argue that we are living in a 
“national security state” in which the Executive’s power to act in the name of  national security goes 
relatively unchecked by Congress.285 Constitutional scholars have worried that Congress has not 
acted to restrain the Executive for violating the War Powers Act by bombing Libya. 286 But if  Con-
gress is not inclined to check the Executive in its pursuit of  territorial war—the kind of  thing we 
are doing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya—there will be less incentive to do so in the nonterritorial 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
resources and draw public attention. This is less true for the targeted interventions typical of  nonter-
?????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
real political pressure on the President to protect outsiders. The same dynamics that prevent outsid-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????-
litical pushback to the Executive’s decisions to target outsiders. Consider the political response—or 
lack thereof—to the Obama Administration’s decision to kill a U.S. citizen, or the failure of  victims 
of  extraordinary rendition to garner a political remedy.
There has been one exception—Guantanamo. Guantanamo became a political issue. But the 
political salience of  Guantanamo was spurred on by the willingness of  courts to take cases from 
Guantanamo detainees. 
283  DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM,
22-46, 88-128 (2005) (discussing how the Department of  Justice’s detention tactics not only violated criminal and 
immigration law standards but also failed at actually capturing terrorists by basing their detention standards on race).
284  Less than 1% of  the U.S. population is Muslim. Cathy Lynn Grossman, Number of  U.S. Muslims to Double, USA
TODAY (Jan. 26 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-01-27-1Amuslim27_ST_N.htm. As of  2008, there 
???????????? ????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????See Scott Mcleod, Where Arab Votes 
Could be Crucial, MIDDLE EAST BLOG, TIME (September 18, 2008), http://mideast.blogs.time.com/2008/09/18/will_the_
arab_vote_count_for_o/.
285  See generally????????????????????????? ??????????Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1789 (2010).
286  Bruce Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at A27.
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B. Judicial Politics
In the last decade or so, progressive scholars have argued that the political branches, and not 
the judiciary, are—for normative, historical and prudential reasons—the best guardians of  the 
Constitution. They have proposed various versions of  popular constitutionalism—some weak and 
some strong—all of  which relegate the courts to a lesser role in constitutional interpretation.287 This 
?????????????????????????????????????????288—has received some pushback.289 Whatever one makes 
of  popular constitutionalism, though, courts are the best near-term hope for outsiders against the 
national security power. 
The national security power, on the other hand, operates in secret, both because there is a 
legitimate need for government secrecy and because the deference granted the Executive by other 
branches allows it to escape oversight. When outsiders are targets, the government has additional 
ways to limit their political power. Most outsiders are unable to vote. Nor can they generally bring 
their issues to the public. The U.S. media is less inclined to cover events in Bosnia-Herzegovina than 
in Kansas. When using the national security power, the political branches also have the power to con-
trol outsiders—to put someone where political recourse is unavailable to them. Most obviously, it can 
do this by operating covertly, by killing people without process or placing them in dark sites where 
they cannot access lawyers or reporters. Less drastically, it can move detainees out of  the country, or, 
as it allegedly did in al Maqaleh, from their home countries into a theater of  war.290
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a narrative that the media and politicians can refer to. Political awareness of  extraordinary rendition 
would rise if  one of  the victimized transferees won a verdict—indeed, it would rise if  the victims 
could reach the merits phase of  a trial, which would allow for discovery and testimony. Indeed, the 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
complainant will win, or that the court will even have jurisdiction. But to someone who is pushed 
outside the legal system—to a detainee in Guantanamo or Afghanistan—the very ability to argue 
in court, even if  only at the pleadings, is a way to demonstrate humanity. Outsiders, in literal terms, 
are asking to be “people”291 under the Constitution.292 Courts are the doorways to that personhood. 
The courts’ role as arbiter of  personhood is consistent with policy perfection. Stated at this level 
of  abstraction, the claim seems airy. But it presents itself  tangibly. If  the government is not able to 
kill people without trial because they are outside the United States, it must ask itself  whether kill-
287  See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004);
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999); RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE THE PEOPLE RULE”: A POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST MANIFESTO (1994).
288  See id.
289  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of  Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1013 (2004).
290  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
291  U.S. CONST. Am. IV (protecting the right of  the “people”). See also U.S. CONST. Ams. V, XIV (protecting the rights 
of  “person[s])”.
292  The judicial battle over personhood is jurisdictional, and jurisdiction has been the main sticking point in these 
cases—in the habeas claims of  the Guantanamo and Bagram detainees, but also the political-question and state-secrets 
doctrines that prevent other outsiders from pressing their claims. See supra Parts II.A.  and II.C.  
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ing people without trial is a good idea. If  it cannot preventively detain people because they are not 
citizens, it must ask itself  whether it should preventively detain citizens.
Indeed, Boumediene proves this claim. It establishes that noncitizens outside the country some-
times have the right to get into court.293 Ultimately, this will push the issue of  extraterritorial rights—
and associated war-on-terror issues, back to Congress. Given its options, policy perfection is prob-
ably the Court’s best choice. The debate, as it is now structured, is between progressives who want 
the Court to adopt international law and more conservative scholars who are happier to leave total 
control with the political branches. But the Court will not take either choice. It is doctrinally and 
politically constrained from adopting international law.294 Nor can the Court leave the war power 
entirely to the political branches.295
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
national security exception, the Court has held that outsiders sometimes have rights, hoping that this 
will force Congress to instantiate them. 
The Court’s desire to involve Congress is perfectly plain. As it explained in Boumediene:
???????????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??? ???????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????-
rorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might 
not have this luxury. This result is not inevitable, however. The political branches, con-
sistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the Constitution,
can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while 
protecting the Nation from terrorism.296
VI. SOLUTIONS
In this section I want to draw out the implications of  my theory. First, I want to make some pre-
dictions about what will happen and then some loose recommendations about what we should do. I 
say “loose” because a mandate towards equality does not predict any single outcome, and cannot be 
effectuated through any single doctrinal pathway. That said, equality has consequences that are not 
captured by any other approach.
First, I do not think that the courts (or, for that matter Congress) will expressly rely on “equal-
ity” to guide their decisions about outsiders, except to the extent that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires equal treatment of  noncitizens at home.297 If  the Court rejects membership, it will be 
293  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
294  Supra Part IV.B.  
295  See supra Part IV.A.  
296  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797-98; See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[J]
udicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that 
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic means—how best to do so.”).
297  See generally Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (2007).
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through decisions that reduce the salience of  citizenship and territory against applications of  the 
national security power. Because the Court mostly uses doctrinal and originalist rhetoric to justify its 
decisions, future decisions will use these modalities, as Boumediene did.298
Second, the courts will not embrace international law as an independent restraint on the political 
branches. Rather, if  the Supreme Court rejects membership, it will rely on the Constitution. Still, in 
the long run rejection of  the membership model will push the United States towards international 
law even if  international law does not form the basis of  that rejection. If  any branch is forced to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
could use international law to determine the constitutional limit of  the war power.299 Or the judicial 
requirement that outsiders be treated equally might lead Congress to use international law to control 
?????????????????????????????
Normatively, the membership theory suggests a political strategy for those who are interested in 
protecting outsiders’ rights and fostering Congressional engagement with national security law. This 
strategy is to allow some domestic application of  national security practices in exchange for equal 
treatment of  outsiders. Progressives should be open to accepting a national security court if  they 
can ensure it treats citizens, aliens, and people captured abroad equally, and, more importantly, that 
they are equally likely to end up in that court. 
The same is true of  preventive detention. Indeed, equality should be the price of  admission for 
progressive involvement in the creation of  new national security approaches. For preventive deten-
tion this would mean not just the creation of  a preventive-detention law that applies to citizens at 
home but also changes to immigration law that prevent the Executive from using it as preventive 
detention.300 Any such law would also have to provide that it was the exclusive means of  preventive 
detention.301
For aliens inside the United States, the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses are the clear-
est pathways to equality against national security practices.302 There is, for example, a case that the 
Military Commission Acts’ differential treatment of  territorial aliens violates Equal Protection.303
Rejection of  membership suggests presumptive equality for extraterritorial recognition of  rights 
against the war powers. This does not mean that location never matters. It means only that loca-
????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
to observe Constitutional rights in extraterritorial actions like the raid on Osama Bin Laden than it 
is when acting at home. But lumping the Bin Laden attack in with the rendition of  el-Masri merely 
because both occurred overseas is foolish. Courts should be able to look past the categorization of  
“abroad” and see whether national security interests are actually at stake.
298  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739-72. As someone who tends to think that these modalities produce indeterminate 
results, at least for these kinds of  purposes, I am not worried that the Court will be unable to reject membership if  it 
uses them. C.f. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
299  See supra Part IV.B.  
300  See Cole, supra note 5, at 740-41. 
301  C.f. id. at 748-50. 
302  See generally Katyal, supra note 297.
303  Id.
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This requires the disentangling of  substantive and membership factors. The notion of  a “battle-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????304 It 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
people simply captured abroad. Similarly, the site of  capture, which can tell us something about the 
threat a target poses and the cost of  capturing him, should be distinguished from the site of  deten-
tion, which tells us where the Executive wants to keep someone. More broadly, the Executive should 
not be able to divest someone of  rights by moving them. If  there are extrinsic reasons to keep 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
the mere decision to detain someone abroad—even in a theater of  war—should not justify discrimi-
nation.
CONCLUSION
Equality is a risk. It ties the rights of  the powerless to the powerful, trusting that the powerful 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
a way forward for outsiders, it is this way, because it takes the body politic as it is. There are other, 
clearer visions of  the good, but each relies on some structure that does not exist—an international 
body, committed to universal rights, that can bring the United States to heel, or a Congress inclined 
to care about what happens to aliens abroad. These visions are themselves a kind of  politics, but 




???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????????????
another terrorist attack on the scale of  9/11. It could be plausible to treat people captured near the attack under a 
different set of  rules. So long as citizens and noncitizens in the affected area were treated the same, this treatment would 
be substantive, not membership based.
